



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
FY 1996/FY 1997 BIENNIAL BUDGET

19950329 006



READINESS JUSTIFICATION BOOK  
FEBRUARY 1995




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## INTRODUCTION

In a September 27, 1993 Senate Appropriations Report, the Senate directed "the Department to submit, along with the other justification materials accompanying the Department's 1995 O&M budget request and for each year thereafter, a readiness J-book. Information provided in this report should include, as a minimum, indicators for each military service which describe historical trends in, the current status of, and future prospects for: achieving manpower fill rates in critical force units; sustaining manpower skill levels and training activities; meeting accession goals and quality; satisfying reenlistment requirements; meeting manpower Category-rating (C-rating) requirements; sustaining equipment fill rates; and achieving equipment mission capable rating goals."

## SECTION I: MILITARY PERSONNEL

The foundation of the Department of the Navy's manpower strategy is that personnel reductions must keep pace with force structure drawdowns. This resultant smaller force structure can become unbalanced with a mismatch of properly needed skills for both officer and enlisted personnel; the people in these "overmanned" areas must then be targeted for conversion to other specialties or for early release. Similarly, as our paygrade pyramid shrinks, its shape must remain the same, i.e., junior paygrades must be downsized at the same rate as the senior paygrades.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps desire to protect force readiness in the near term by protecting quality people currently on board, maintain sufficient accession levels to preclude a "hollow force" in the future, manage officer accessions and retention to maintain the correct grade/quality mix, improve recruit quality to reduce attrition and ensure long term readiness, and rebalance the enlisted skill mix using existing force management tools.

The Department of the Navy, where applicable, is drawing down in a controlled, steady manner. Far from focusing solely on reducing end strength numbers, we are committed to replenishing and retaining a core of experienced and well-trained people who will effectively execute our mission now and in the future.

Military Personnel Inventories  
Navy  
Part I Total Manning

	<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1994					
Active	503,200	493,600	98.1%	446,300	88.7%
Reserve	112,400	113,400	101.0%	106,600	94.8%
FY 1995					
Active	445,000	418,000	93.9%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	119,000	100,200	84.2%	N/A	N/A
FY 1996					
Active	445,700	407,900	91.5%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	114,900	98,100	85.4%	N/A	N/A
FY 1997					
Active	445,400	390,300	87.6%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	112,500	101,900	90.58%	N/A	N/A

Data does not include Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMAS) or Individual Account.

Synopsis of Significant Changes

The Navy's programmed manning is oriented toward ensuring that personnel are available to meet the manpower requirements established by force structure. The end strength reflects the decreasing manpower requirements in response to the reduction in force structure.

Exhibit A, Part I

Military Personnel Inventories  
 Marine Corps  
 Part I Total Manning

	<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1994					
Active	162,300	145,800	90.0%	145,400	99.7%
Reserve	40,900	37,700	92.0%	36,500	97.0%
FY 1995					
Active	161,000	144,400	90.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	41,300	37,600	91.0%	N/A	N/A
FY 1996					
Active	160,700	144,700	90.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	42,600	39,000	92.0%	N/A	N/A
FY 1997					
Active	159,700	144,600	91.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	42,600	39,000	92.0%	N/A	N/A

Synopsis of Significant Changes

Includes those Reserve Marines on the Active Reserve Program.

Exhibit A, Part I

Military Personnel Inventories  
Navy  
Part II Manning for Tactical Air Forces

Programmed Requirement	Budgeted End_Strength	Percent Manning	Actual End_Strength	Percent Achieved
FY 1994				
Active	24,100	89.9%	23,900	89.2%
Reserve	4,100	102.5%	2,100	52.5%
FY 1995				
Active	22,200	100.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	1,600	76.1%	N/A	N/A
FY 1996				
Active	21,400	100.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	1,800	85.7%	N/A	N/A
FY 1997				
Active	19,400	102.6%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	1,800	85.71%	N/A	N/A

Exhibit A, Part II

**Military Personnel Inventories**  
**U.S. Marine Corps**  
**Part II Manning for Tactical Air Forces**

	<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
<b>FY 1994</b>					
Active	41,516	37,374	90.0%	35,192	94.0%
Reserve	8,835	8,835	100.0%	8,780	99.0%
<b>FY 1995</b>					
Active	41,542	36,894	89.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	8,936	8,510	95.0%	N/A	N/A
<b>FY 1996</b>					
Active	41,542	36,989	89.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	8,932	8,506	95.0%	N/A	N/A
<b>FY 1997</b>					
Active	41,630	37,246	89.0%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	9,000	8,574	95.0%	N/A	N/A

Exhibit A, Part II

Military Personnel Inventories

Navy

Part III Manning for Ship Operating Forces

	Programmed Requirement	Budgeted End Strength	Percent Manning	Actual End Strength	Percent Achieved
FY 1994	279,500	252,000	90.2%	248,800	89.0%
	70,100	68,700	98.0%	69,300	98.9%
FY 1995	254,400	241,800	95.0%	N/A	N/A
	77,100	64,800	84.1%	N/A	N/A
FY 1996	250,800	226,700	90.4%	N/A	N/A
	75,000	64,200	85.6%	N/A	N/A
FY 1997	249,800	219,200	87.8%	N/A	N/A
	73,200	62,400	85.25%	N/A	N/A

For various classes of ships which were decommissioned, appropriate manpower adjustments were made to accommodate the reduced number of ships.

Exhibit A, Part III

## Military Personnel Inventories

Navy

## Part IV Manning for Land Combat Forces

	Programmed Requirement	Budgeted End Strength	Percent Manning	Actual End Strength	Percent Achieved
FY 1994					
Active	5,600	5,600	100.0%	5,100	91.1%
Reserve	2,200	2,200	100.0%	2,000	90.9%
FY 1995					
Active	5,900	5,700	96.6%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	2,200	2,200	100.0%	N/A	N/A
FY 1996					
Active	5,900	5,700	96.6%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	2,200	2,200	100.0%	N/A	N/A
FY 1997					
Active	5,900	5,700	96.6%	N/A	N/A
Reserve	2,200	2,200	100.0%	N/A	N/A

Exhibit A, Part IV

Military Personnel Inventories  
 U. S. Marine Corps  
 Part V Fleet Marine Force Manning

Programmed Requirement	Budgeted End Strength	Percent Manning	Actual End Strength	Percent Achieved
FY 1994 Active	120,400	108,500	90.0%	105,200
FY 1995 Active	119,300	105,900	89.0%	N/A
FY 1996 Active	119,100	106,000	89.0%	N/A
FY 1997 Active	118,200	105,600	89.0%	N/A

Exhibit A, Part V

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade  
Navy

		<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>	<u>FY 1996</u>	<u>FY 1997</u>
<b>E1-E4</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	199,664	187,321	188,174	180,751
Actual		199,664	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>E5-E9</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	202,962	187,879	177,021	168,099
Actual		202,962	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Cadets</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	4,277	4,000	4,000	4,000
Actual		4,286	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Warrant Officers</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	2,534	2,303	1,891	1,613
Actual		2,534	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>01-03</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	36,872	37,507	35,540	33,620
Actual		36,872	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>04-06</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	22,115	21,942	21,868	21,102
Actual		22,115	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>07-10</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	229	215	215	215
Actual		229	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	468,662	439,200	428,000	409,400
Actual		468,662	N/A	N/A	N/A

By grade fluctuations from FY 1994 to FY 1997 are driven by force structure requirements.

Exhibit B

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade  
Naval Reserves

		<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>	<u>FY 1996</u>	<u>FY 1997</u>
<b>E1-E4</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	30,643	28,342	27,394	26,762
Actual		29,673	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>E5-E9</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	42,577	35,865	34,667	33,901
Actual		37,548	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Cadets</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Actual		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Warrant Officers</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	394	444	447	436
Actual		498	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>01-03</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	8,607	9,886	9,921	9,703
Actual		11,068	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>04-06</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	11,734	8,624	8,652	8,462
Actual		9,659	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>07-10</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	76	38	37	34
Actual		43	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>					
Budgeted	End Strength	94,031	83,200	81,118	79,328
Actual		88,488	N/A	N/A	N/A

Exhibit B

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade  
U.S. Marine Corps

	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>	<u>FY 1996</u>	<u>FY 1997</u>
<b>E1-E4</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	106,518	106,671	106,535	106,534
Actual	106,551	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>E5-E9</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	49,505	49,352	49,487	49,488
Actual	49,784	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Warrant Officers</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	1,871	1,769	1,773	1,778
Actual	1,817	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>01-03</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	10,630	10,727	10,724	10,719
Actual	10,702	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>04-06</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	5,413	5,413	5,413	5,413
Actual	5,236	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>07-10</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	63	68	68	68
Actual	68	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Total</b>				
Budgeted End Strength	174,000	174,000	174,000	174,000
Actual	174,158	N/A	N/A	N/A

Exhibit B

## Section II: MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCESSIONS/REENLISTMENTS

The Department of the Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of people in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. A key element in manning the smaller, more technical combat units of the future is the ability to successfully recruit to requirements for high school diploma graduate and upper mental group enlistees. The Department will need a quality future force because people are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply.

Quality of Active Duty Enlisted Accessions  
Navy

	FY 1994 Estimate	FY 1994 Actual	FY 1995 Estimate	FY 1995 Actual	FY 1996 Estimate	FY 1997 Estimate
Non Prior Service Accessions	53,178	53,178	50,000	50,000	53,674	53,770
With High School Diploma	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%
Without High School Diploma	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>53,178</b>	<b>53,178</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>53,674</b>	<b>53,770</b>
Mental Category I-III	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Mental Category IV	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>53,178</b>	<b>53,178</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>53,674</b>	<b>53,770</b>
Subtotal Non Prior Service Accessions	53,178	53,178	50,000	50,000	53,674	53,770
Prior Service Accessions	18	182	2,062	2,062	2,000	2,000
<b>Total Active Duty Accessions</b>	<b>53,196</b>	<b>53,360</b>	<b>52,062</b>	<b>52,062</b>	<b>55,674</b>	<b>55,770</b>

Maintaining the quality of enlisted accessions remains an essential element in our plans for the Navy of the 21st century. The insistence for quality continues in response to demands of technology present aboard our ships, submarines, and aircraft. Recruiting quality has become increasingly difficult due to the reduced pool of 17-21 year old males and females and the misperception of the public that the military no longer offers a viable career due to the drawdown.

Exhibit C

Quality of Active Duty Enlisted Accessions  
U.S. Marine Corps

	FY 1994 Estimate	FY 1994 Actual	FY 1995 Estimate	FY 1995 Actual	FY 1996 Estimate	FY 1996 Actual	FY 1997 Estimate
<b>Non Prior Service Accessions</b>							
With High School Diploma	30,453	30,778	33,153	33,153	33,664	33,664	35,085
Without High School Diploma	1,603	1,190	1,745	1,745	1,772	1,772	1,847
<b>Total</b>	<b>32,056</b>	<b>31,968</b>	<b>34,898</b>	<b>34,898</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>36,932</b>
Mental Category I-III	32,056	31,962	34,898	34,898	35,436	35,436	36,932
Mental Category IV	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>32,056</b>	<b>31,968</b>	<b>34,898</b>	<b>34,898</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>36,932</b>
Prior Service Accessions**		110	750	750			
Total Active Duty Accessions	32,056	32,078	35,648	35,648	35,436	35,436	36,932

Synopsis of Significant changes/trends:

- \* Mental category IV are not routinely authorized; must meet stringent waiver criteria.
- \*\* There is no regular prior service accession goal; each request must be staffed through HQMC for approval on a case by case basis.

Exhibit C

Enlisted Accessions  
Navy

		Prior Service		Non-Prior Service		Total	
		<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>
FY 1994							
Active		18	182	35,921	35,939	35,939	35,939
Reserve		10,398	9,876	2,725	3,425	13,123	13,301
FY 1995							
Active		2,062	N/A	36,024	N/A	38,086	N/A
Reserve		14,000	N/A	2,672	N/A	16,672	N/A
FY 1996							
Active		2,000	N/A	35,684	N/A	37,684	N/A
Reserve		18,433	N/A	3,518	N/A	21,951	N/A
FY 1997							
Active		2,000	N/A	35,780	N/A	37,780	N/A
Reserve		18,335	N/A	3,499	N/A	21,834	N/A

Navy has reduced new accessions as a major step in our personnel strategy, but end strength targets cannot be met solely through this action.

Exhibit D

Enlisted Accessions  
U.S. Marine Corps

		Prior Service		Non-Prior Service		Total	
		Goal	Actual	Goal	Actual	Goal	Actual
FY 1994							
Active	0	110		32,056	31,968	32,056	32,078
Reserve	5,200	4,500	5,922	5,869	11,122	10,266	
FY 1995							
Active	750			34,898		35,648	
Reserve	4,098	5,237		5,237		9,335	
FY 1996							
Active	0			35,436		35,436	
Reserve	4,100			6,090		10,190	
FY 1997							
Active	0			36,932		36,932	
Reserve	4,100			6,380		10,480	

Exhibit D

Number of Enlisted Reenlistments  
Navy

	FY 1994 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1994 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1995 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1995 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1996 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1997 <u>Budgeted</u>
First Term	18,762	18,762	14,798	12,287	15,986	
Career	27,228	27,228	29,194	30,250	29,018	
Total	45,990	45,990	43,587	42,134	44,606	
Enlisted First Term Attrition	37,087	37,087	26,292	19,455	29,122	
Enlisted First Term Retention Rate	35.7	35.7	36.0	36.0	36.0	

Exhibit E

Number of Enlisted Reenlistments  
U.S. Marine Corps

	FY 1994 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1994 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1995 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1996 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1997 <u>Budgeted</u>
First Term	4,004	4,004	4,057	4,100	4,100
Career *	8,057	7,635	9,038	10,816	10,847
Total	11,633	11,639	13,095	14,916	14,947
Enlisted First Term Attrition **	13,200	12,845	13,600	13,500	13,700
Enlisted First Term Retention Rate	20.5%	20.5%	21.8%	20.1%	21.8%

\* Includes both in-year and out-year reenlistments.

\*\* Enlisted first term attrition are those Marines who separate before their initial obligated service is completed.

Exhibit E

### SECTION III: OPERATING TEMPO

Ship operations underway time is budgeted and measured by Ship OPTEMPO. Ship OPTEMPO represents the average number of underway days for ships operating in the deployed (6TH Fleet, 7TH Fleet, and Middle East Force) operating areas and the non-deployed (2ND Fleet and 3RD Fleet) operating areas. Ship OPTEMPO budgeting objectives are set at a level which allows the deployed Fleet forces to meet national commitments and provides sufficient underway time to allow the non-deployed Fleet forces to train and serve as a surge force. Naval Reserve Force ships OPTEMPO is budgeted at 18 days per quarter with the Reserve carrier (CV-67) budgeted at 31 days per quarter.

TACAIR/ASW provides funding for Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air (TACAIR) and aviation Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces. Tactical Air squadrons conduct strike operations against a wide range of threats identified in the national strategy and provide long range and local protection against airborne and surface threats. Anti-Submarine Warfare squadrons locate, destroy and provide force protection against sub-surface threats, and conduct maritime surveillance operations. The TACAIR/ASW requirement for active flying hours is based on the number of crews assigned to a squadron. Each crew is funded at a specific level of primary mission readiness (PMR) to achieve the overall active Navy goal of 83% PMR with an additional 2% of PMR achieved through simulator usage. With each active crew flying the hours indicated in Exhibit G, which includes simulator contribution, Navy and Marine Corps will achieve 85% PMR. The Navy and Marine Corp Reserve Tactical Air squadrons have an overall PMR goal of 87% PMR with .25% PMR coming from simulators. For Reserve pilots 100% PMR is defined as 150 hours per pilot.

Training Opportunity Indicators (Quantities)  
Department of Navy

	FY 1994 Actual	FY 1994 Budgeted	FY 1995 Actual	FY 1995 Budgeted	FY 1996 Actual	FY 1996 Budgeted	FY 1997 Actual	FY 1997 Budgeted
<b>Flying Hours/Crew/Month (Includes Simulators)</b>								
Navy Tactical Air/ASW	24	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
Marine Tactical Air	22	22	23	23	23	23	23	23
Navy Reserve Tactical Air/ASW*	12.1	12.2	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4
Marine Corps Reserve Tactical Air*	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8
<b>Navy Steaming Days/Quarter</b>								
Deployed Fleets	55.8	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5	50.5
Nondeployed Fleets	32.0	29.0	29.0	29.0	29.0	29.0	29.0	29.0
Reserve Fleets	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0
Reserve Carrier	0	0	0	0	0	31.0	31.0	31.0
Marine Corps Battalion Field Training Days **	5,138	5,138	5,215	5,215	5,067	5,207		

Synopsis of Significant Changes

\*Reserve requirements do not include simulator hours. Also the Naval Reserve requirements do not include pilots from CVWR-30, VA-205 and VF-202. These squadrons decommissioned in FY 1994 and the pilots did not meet annual requirements in that year.

\*\* Does not include Reconnaissance Companies which were formerly categorized as battalions.

Note: Standard position on Battalion Field Training Days (BFTD); the Marine Corps' historical position has been that BFTD's are an indicator of activity only and not direct indicators of readiness. Also, BFTD's cannot be tied directly to funding levels.

Exhibit F

Strategic Surge Capability  
U.S. Marine Corps

The following table displays the amount of pre-positioned stocks afloat and material ashore that could be moved in a 30 day period.

<u>Prepositioned Material</u>		<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>	<u>FY 1996</u>	<u>FY 1997</u>
Afloat					
Number of Ships		13	13	13	13
Short Tons		154,371	154,371	154,371	154,371
Ashore					
Number of Sites		6	6	6	6
Short Tons		26,160	26,160	26,160	26,160

AFLOAT represents the amount of short tons prepositioned on the MPF ships, which can be deployed anywhere in the world within thirty days. These stocks provide thirty days of combat supplies for a Maritime Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) - sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

ASHORE represents the amount of short tons prepositioned in Norway, which is governed by a bilateral agreement between the governments of Norway and the United States. A concurrence is required between the governments to activate/remove the equipment which provide thirty days of combat supplies for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) - sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

Exhibit G

## Force Structure

For the ship forces Percentage of Time Free (POTF) measures the amount of time during a fiscal year that ships did not report any critical mission degrading equipment Casualty Reports (CASREPS). Material CASREPS indicate degradations to equipment and systems which can not be repaired in a timely manner by ship's force due to a lack of onboard spares or the inability to effect repairs because of ongoing operations, ship repair capability, or lack of technical expertise. The Navy does not have established goals for POTF. The FY 1994 and FY 1995 projections of POTF are composite values for all surface ships.

For aviation forces, Fully Mission Capable (FMC) is the material condition of an aircraft that can perform all of its missions defined in the Mission Essential Subsystems Matrices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. Mission Capable (MC) is the material condition of an aircraft that can perform at least one and potentially all of its missions defined in the Mission Essential Subsystems Matrices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. The calculation of FMC/MC is based on the number of aircraft in reportable status; that is the total inventory less those aircraft in standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM). The difference between FMC/MC rates reported by Navy and Marine Corps is a result of the aircraft mix that is operated by each Service.

Force Structure - Active  
Mission Capable Rates

		FY 1994 Goal	FY 1994 Actual	FY 1995 Goal	FY 1995 Actual	FY 1996 Goal	FY 1996 Actual	FY 1997 Goal	FY 1997 Actual
Navy	Tactical/ASW Aircraft								
	Fully Mission Capable (FMC)	56	58.3	56	56	56	56	56	56
	Mission Capable (MC)	73	69.9	73	73	73	73	73	73
Marine Corps	Tactical Aircraft								
	Fixed Wing	60/70	76/81	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70
	Rotary Wing	60/70	68/75	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70	60/70
	Fully Mission Capable (FMC)	56	73.4	56	56	56	56	56	56
	Mission Capable (MC)	73	79.1	73	73	73	73	73	73
Ship Battle Forces (POTF)									
	Aircraft Carriers	76	42.0	72	72	72	72	71	71
	Surface Combatants	76	68.0	72	72	72	72	71	71
	Amphibious	76	76.0	75	75	75	75	77	77
	Combat Logistics	76	70.0	73	73	73	72	71	71
	Mobile Logistics	76	86.0	73	73	73	72	71	71
	Fleet Support	76	71.0	73	73	73	72	71	71
Marine Corps (Note 1)									
	Fire Support	87.0	90.4	82.0	82.0	88.0	88.0	88.5	88.5
	Combat Vehicles	89.5	86.1	88.3	88.3	88.9	88.9	88.0	88.0

FMC: Fully Mission Capable  
MC: Mission Capable

POTF: Percent Time Free of C3/C4 Casualty Reports. FY 1995 through FY 1997 values are projections vice specific goals. FY 1994 actual values represent data through the third quarter. Aircraft carrier actual POTF value was skewed by a single system software defect which damped overall readiness.

Note (1):

- a. The Marine Corps does not report combat essential ground equipment as fully Mission Capable (FMC), therefore, Mission Capable (MC) is the more appropriate measure.

- b. Definitions;
  - "Fire Support" consists of the M198 155mm Howitzer and the M101A1 105mm Towed Howitzer.
  - "Combat Vehicles" consists of the M1A1 Tank, and the LAV and AAV families.
- c. The increase in projected readiness rates for Fire Support in FY 1996 and FY 1997 is due to the M101A1 Howitzers being either removed from the Marine Corps inventory or used for ceremonial purposes.

Exhibit H